Informatics and Sustainability

Internet and Reality – The real and the fake in the digital age HS2015 / Prof. Dr. M. Hilty

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Digital Image Doctoring



Digital Image Doctoring





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Cloning

- Technique
 - copy and pasting of objects
- Artifacts
 - repeating patterns in image
- Detection
 - find similar and spacially coherent image regions





Lighting

- Technique
 - move objects from one setting to another
- Artifacts
 - inconsistent light direction
- Detection
 - estimate direction of light by brightness distribution on sufaces
 - detect inconsistencies







Re-touching

- Technique


 adjusting colors / contrast / white balance, sharpness, noise, removing elements or visible flaws on skin or materials

- Artifacts

 distorted correlations in color-sensor array

- Detection

detect wrong correlations





Negative Effects

Propaganda (for / against persons or topics)









Negative Effects

Alteration of history (removing objects or persons from historical images)





YouTube views – fake or real?

Advertisment on YouTube

- Enable AdSense on the account (account monetization)
- 45/55 split of all YouTube advertising
 - 45% for Google
 - 55% for the content creator
- Average cost per thousand YouTube views (2013): \$ 7.80





Winners and Losers of fake views

- Advertisers are charged on the basis of how many times their advertisments are viewed.
- Winners:
 - (Google that charges for the advertisment)
 - Content creators who get a part of these revenues and propably more popularity than they would without boosting their view count.
- Losers:
 - Advertisers who pay for fake views \rightarrow click fraud or "invalid traffic" as Google prefers to call it

How to fake YouTube views?

- Low-wage work force
- Purchase fake YouTube views
- Purchase or program a bot/algorithm to increase the traffic figures:
 - \$ 250 billion spent by advertisers for marketing each year from which they probably lose \$ 6 billion to such bots/algorithms



Not only YouTube views ...

- ... can be bought, also comments, likes, etc.
- A lot of other services can be bought as well.





Conclusion on digital frauds

- Advertisers lose a lot of money through fake YouTube views and other digital frauds.
- Google tries to filter this "invalid traffic" in order to not lose their credibility.
- How much trust should we the people put in what digital service providers tell us?



Malware and (computer) trust

Types of malware

- Computer viruses (or worms)
- Trojan horses (when for governments: (euphemistically) GovWare)
- Scareware
- Spyware
- Adware
- Ransomware

Example: scareware business


- Software which scares users and creates incentives to carry out payments (e. g. to buy fake Anti-Virus (AV) software).
- Three main ways of infection
 - Social engineering
 - Drive-by downloads
 - Installation via botnets
- In an investigation (Stone-Gross et al. 2011) of three fake AV criminal networks, following figures emerged, for observation times of 3 months (AV1), 16 months (AV2) and 30 months (AV3):

Vendor	Prices	# infections	# sales	income/month
AV1	\$ 50-70	8.4 millions	189k	\$ 3 millions
AV2	\$ 50–90	6.6 milliions	137k	\$ 313k
AV3	\$ 60–100	91.3 millions	1.97 millions	\$ 3.9 millions



Example: Trojans / GovWare lowering IT security

Swiss Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications (DETEC) created (disclosed) malware to intercept Skype calls (Mini-/MegaPanzer); showing e. g. ways to undermine IT security.





Example: Trojans / GovWare fabricating evidence

Hacking Team's Galileo Trojan Horse for Governments (GovWare) was leaked; showing e. g. ways to fabricate evidence.

```
CL A https://github.com/hackedteam/rcs-common/blob/master/lib/rcs-common/evidence/file.rb#L17
Apps For quick access, place your bookmarks here on the bookmarks bar. Import bookmarks now...
                                                                            Cther bookm
FLFM DFLTMTTFR = 0xABADCODF
def content(*args)
  hash = [args].flatten.first || {}
  process = hash[:process] || ["Explorer.exe\0", "Firefox.e
  process.encode!("US-ASCII")
  path = hash[:path] || ["C:\\Utenti\\pippo\\pedoporno.mpg"
  path = path.to_utf16le_binary_null
```

How to trust trust?

- Pre-infected hardware (infected chips, firmware etc.)
- Pre-infected operating systems (system level backdoors)
- Backdoor-containing compilers
 - Cf. Karger & Shell (1974) on "Trap Door Insertion" describing boot level and compiler level backdoors.
 - Cf. Ken Thompson (1984) on "Reflections on Trusting Trust" describing a compiler level backdoor, inserting (and such preserving) itself when compiling future compiler versions.



Example: Spyware appearing in App repositories

XcodeGhost: Manipulated Software Development Kits (SDKs) introduced malware into Apple's App Store (and Google Play).



Apple Bans 100s Of iPhone Apps For Stealing Personal Data



Apple announced yesterday that it had pulled hundreds of apps from its App Store because they violated the App Store's review process by collecting unapproved kir of data.

A third-party analytics service called SourceDNA discovered that apps using a software developer kit (SDK) from a Chinese advertising platform called Youml, were collecting personally identifiable data, including email addresses, Apple IDs,



End



Questions & Comments?





Discussion questions

- What are other possibilities to fake and distribute digital information?
- What are (further) possibilities to prove/check/detect the correctness of digital information?
- What is really provable by technology (trust/control over the technology), or: can a computer be trusted in general terms?